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"Justice is not there unless there is also understanding."'
The judicial opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court are binding
law in America, impacting nearly every aspect of life in the polity. And
yet, both their sheer complexity and astonishing length render them
unintelligible to most Americans. But regardless of whether they are
understood or not, the Court's opinions establish a range of compulsory
legal obligations that apply to all who fall within its sweeping jurisdic-
tion. And compliance with these obligations is essential, for the individ-
ual who fails to comport her behavior accordingly risks confrontation
with the coercive power of the State. This situation thus presents a
troubling paradox: while the Court's opinions constitute the rule of law,
governing a wide array of both public and private affairs, the average
American is likely to find them utterly incomprehensible.
The problematic nature of the unintelligibility paradox is similarly
highlighted by the essential democratic values that the practice of judi-
cial opinion writing otherwise redounds to society. At the heart of Amer-
ican political theory is the foundational principle that legitimate political
authority is rooted in public consent-as the Declaration of Indepen-
dence phrases it, only through the "consent of the governed" are the
"just powers" of government derived.2 But while the elected branches of
government are able to secure legitimacy qua consent at the ballot box,
an unelected and life-tenured federal judicial branch cannot. These
judges must instead rely upon the power of persuasion; that is, by pro-
viding reasoned justifications for their rulings, judges are able to secure
the "tacit approval and obedience of the governed."' And yet, persuasion
* J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. The author would like to thank
Michelle Singer, Joseph Serota, Robert Dolehide, and Ethan Leib for their helpful advice and
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1. People v. Dixon, 231 N.Y. 111, 130 (1921) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. Ray Forrester, Supreme Court Opinions-Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 173 (1995).
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demands comprehension at the very least. As such, when judicial opin-
ions are unintelligible to the governed, judges lack the democratic legiti-
macy that the exercise of reason-giving would otherwise afford them.
The detrimental impact of the unintelligibility of the Court's work,
however, is not lost on many of our nation's commentators, who have
urged the justices to increase both the clarity and brevity of their opin-
ions with the hopes that such changes would make them more accessi-
ble.4 But while such reforms are necessary, they are not alone sufficient
to address the true breadth of the public comprehension gap. The vari-
ance between the complexity of the issues the Court confronts and the
astonishingly low levels of civic literacy in America requires a more
robust, bottom-up approach to reform. This Essay proposes one potential
solution in the form of a two-tier system of opinion publication. Specifi-
cally, it argues that the Court should begin publishing what I call "Public
Opinions"-in essence, a translation of the Court's regular opinions into
a more publicly accessible, civic education-based format-and that it
should also establish an "Office of Public Opinion," consisting of an
interdisciplinary staff of lawyers, civic educators, and civic literacy
experts, to implement a comprehensive Public Opinions program.
I make the case for this type of reform in three parts. Part I begins
with a discussion of the practice of judicial opinion writing, assessing
both the primary functions judicial opinions serve and the normative
benefits that flow from fulfilling those functions. I then explain why
each of these functions requires that judicial opinions be comprehensible
as a general matter, and then assess the more specific question of audi-
ence-that is, "to whom must they be comprehensible?" After briefly
discussing the two approaches commentators take, what I label the "pro-
fessional view" and the "populist view," I set forth an argument in favor
of the latter, suggesting a judicial obligation to write widely accessible
judicial opinions.
Part II then gauges whether and to what extent the Supreme Court's
contemporary opinions meet this obligation, an exploration without
4. See, e.g., id. at 187 (proposing clarity and brevity-based reforms); Nancy A. Wanderer,
Writing Better Opinions: Communicating with Candor, Clarity, and Style, 54 ME. L. REv. 47, 55
(2002) (same); see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTIUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT'S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN
UNDERSTAND 113 (1992) (noting the importance of writing clear and comprehensible judicial
opinions in the context of constitutional law); George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing: Res
Ipsa Loquiter, 86 MICH. L. REv. 333, 335 (1987) (espousing the virtues of clarity and brevity in
legal writing); Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
237 (2008) (describing the ethical implications of clarity and brevity in judicial opinion writing);
Adam Liptak, Justices are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010




encouraging results. The substantial disparity between the complexity
and length of the Court's work and the high levels of civic illiteracy in
America suggests a severe public comprehension gap. Moreover, such
high levels of civic illiteracy also help illuminate why clarity and brev-
ity-based reforms are not alone sufficient to address the comprehension
problem, given that the average American simply does not possess
enough substantive legal knowledge to be capable of confronting many
of the complex issues at the heart of the Court's work, no matter how
clearly or succinctly they are addressed. Having identified the civic illit-
eracy-based architecture of the intelligibility problem, then, I argue that
any attempt to make the Court's work accessible to the public must be
grounded in civic education.
Part III proposes a solution to this quandary by suggesting the
adoption of a two-tiered system of opinion writing that publishes the
complementary civic education-based Public Opinion format alongside
the Court's regular opinions. I first outline the basic components of a
Public Opinion and then explain how a comprehensive Public Opinion
program might best be implemented. I next discuss some of the benefits
that this bifurcated approach could produce, while exploring the Court's
educative mandate that legitimizes them. I then briefly conclude.
I. PHILOSOPHY OF JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING
Judicial writing is a peculiar phenomenon. Article III of the Consti-
tution tasks judges with deciding "Cases" and "Controversies," but says
nothing about how judges ought to communicate their decisions to the
public.' Judges are therefore left with significant discretion to craft their
opinions however they please, and this discretion is clearly reflected in
the wide array of authorial approaches contained in the pages of the
federal reporters. And yet, while the rules of engagement governing the
practice of judicial opinion writing are few and far between, the choices
judges make in this area have important societal consequences. An anal-
ysis of the three primary functions that judicial opinions serve-broadly
conceived as rule of law, legitimacy, and constraint-reveals why.
At its most basic level, a written judicial opinion is simply a means
of resolving a dispute before a court; in the words of the Federal Judicial
Center's Judicial Writing Manual, a published opinion "communicate[s]
a court's conclusions and the reasons for them to the parties and their
lawyers."' But in the American legal system, judicial opinions also serve
a broader function; that is, they establish binding rules of law, or prece-
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
6. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL 1 (1991).
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dents, that apply to all those falling within a court's jurisdiction.' In this
way, published judicial opinions both enable individual actors to deter-
mine "what the law requires of them" and allow "other courts and judges
to decide like cases alike."' These two precedential functions are part
and parcel with the rule of law; by informing the public of its rights and
obligations and facilitating their uniform judicial enforcement, judicial
opinions help create the predictability, certainty, and stability necessary
to establish a "sphere of autonomy within which individuals can act
without fear of government interference."'
Judicial opinions not only facilitate the rule of law, however; they
also serve a vital legitimizing function. It is a foundational principle of
American political theory that the democratic legitimacy of each branch
of government rests upon public consent."o And yet, while the legislative
and executive branches secure that public consent through the electoral
process, an unelected and life-tenured federal judiciary cannot. Surviv-
ing Article II's presidential nomination and Senate confirmation process
is a start"-although the contemporary trend toward "vacuity and
7. RAYMOND WACKS, LAW: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 13 (2008) (explaining that the
building blocks of the American common law system are cases, and that the common law
therefore "elevates the doctrine of precedent to a supreme position"); Judith S. Kaye, Judges As
Wordsmiths, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 1, 1 (1997) (noting that-judges do not "just write decisions, [they]
write precedents").
8. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 961, 1003 (1992); see Forrester, supra note 3, at 173 ("Judicial opinions also serve the
function of setting up 'helpful guide posts' for proper future compliance by lawyers, other judges,
present and future, and, most importantly, the people in general."); Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying
Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REv. 743, 747 (2006) ("By
disclosing the ostensible justifications for a court's decision, an opinion enables the various
audiences to which it is directed to . . . act in response to it.").
9. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 017: Rule of Law, Legal Theory Lexicon,
http://1solum.typepad.com/legal-theoryjexicon/2004/01/legal theory_1e_3.html; see Lawrence B.
Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the
Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 155, 165 (2006) (noting "the rule-of-law
values of predictability, certainty, and stability"); Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady
Doctrine, 5 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 415, 428 (2011) (discussing rule-of-law values).
10. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed."); Wanderer, supra note 4, at 50 (noting the relationship between judicial opinions and
public consent); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction,
81 U. COLo. L. REV. 973, 995 (2010) (explaining that "the Declaration of Independence grounds
American political thought in the consent of the governed" and that although "[t]he Constitution
does not use the same language . . . there can be little doubt the Framers and the Ratifiers
understood that the Constitution, by the very act of breaking down the Articles of Confederation
and reconstituting the government under the new document, fit within the Declaration's consent
theory"); THE FEDERALIST No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (referencing "[t]he establishment of a
Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people.
(emphasis added).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the [Slupreme Court").
[Vol. 66:649652
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farce"12 likely detracts from the democratic legitimacy afforded by this
process-but it is not alone sufficient to account for the judiciary's
power to strike down laws enacted by a democratically elected Congress
and signed by a democratically elected President.13 Rather, as the
Supreme Court has itself noted, the judiciary's legitimacy hinges upon
the practice of producing "legally principled decisions under circum-
stances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be
accepted by the Nation,"l4 or simpler yet, engaging in reason-giving. As
Ray Forrester phrases it, judicial opinions are a democratic concession
to the "exercise of elitist power over a mass of consenting subjects"-
that is, "by explaining and attempting to justify decrees imposed on the
majority," judges thereby "gain the tacit approval and obedience of the
governed."' 5
Finally, judicial opinions serve an essential constraining function,
which they achieve in a cluster of ways. At their most basic level, pub-
lished judicial opinions limit the range of potential outcomes for a case
to those that can be reasonably justified. And while the demands of rea-
sonable justification may not be exacting-due to both the contested
nature of what qualifies as "reasonable" in a given case and the concom-
itant wide-ranging discretion this uncertainty creates-when applied to
the virtuous decisionmaker they can indeed serve as a meaningful con-
straint. As Patricia Wald observes, "[flor a conscientious judge, the sim-
ple obligation to write an opinion persuasively explaining the outcome
of a case is a profound constraint on judicial discretion." 6
12. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 920 (1995)
("When the Senate ceases to engage nominees in meaningful discussion of legal issues, the
confirmation process takes on an air of vacuity and farce, and the Senate becomes incapable of
either properly evaluating nominees or appropriately educating the public."); see Todd E. Pettys,
Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J. L. & POL. 123, 131-32 (2011) (noting that
"senators on both sides of the aisle spend more time accusing their political opponents or the
nominee of favoring unconstitutional judicial activism than asking questions calculated to
illuminate what kind of justice the nominee will be").
13. See Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT'L. L. 81, 90
(1994) (noting the "key role" the "reasoned opinion plays ... in justifying judicial creativity,"
given that "political choices in a democracy are normally reserved for the legislature and
executive").
14. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992);
see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62
U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1372 (1995) (noting that judges write reasoned opinions to reinforce their
"oft-challenged and arguably shaky authority to tell others-including our duly elected political
leaders-what to do") [hereinafter Wald, Rhetoric].
15. Forrester, supra note 3, at 173.
16. Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 904 (1987) [hereinafter
Wald, Thoughts]; see DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND
PoLrIcs IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 44 (2009) (noting that "[tihe best judges, confronting a
2012] 653
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A second, but no less important, constraining function that judicial
opinions serve inheres in their ability to facilitate both public and judi-
cial oversight of judges. As to the former, the requirement that judges
justify their decisions in a publicly available document enables the pub-
lic to monitor the exercise of judicial power, and to respond accord-
ingly." Those judges who issue poorly reasoned decisions may over
time invite "limits on jurisdiction, constitutional amendments, or
changes in the way that litigants, the public, or the popular branches
respond" to their rulings.' 8
The judicial opinion writing requirement similarly constrains the
discretion of judges by facilitating judicial oversight. Consider first the
vertical channel of appellate review, whereby the issuance of a judicial
opinion provides a means for hierarchically superior courts to scrutinize
the decisionmaking of lower courts. By exposing a judge's reasoning to
scrutiny and enabling the reversal of arbitrary, incorrect, or poorly rea-
soned decisions-however infrequently that scrutiny may actually
occurl-judicial review helps limit the occurrence of "misguided or
destructive exercise of judicial power."2 0 There is also a more consist-
ently available, if somewhat less robust, constraint on the judicial discre-
tion of all appellate judges, which is the practice of separate opinion
writing. By issuing a stinging dissent or pointed concurrence, judges are
able to illuminate the flaws in a majority opinion's reasoning and to
offer a public rebuke with the potential to deter an abuse of judicial
power.2 1
decision that 'won't write,' [because it cannot stand up to the requirement of reasoned elaboration]
will change that decision").
17. See George Rose Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing, For Four New Judges, 21 ARK. L.
REV. 197, 200-01 (1967) ("Above all else [the purpose of a judicial opinion is] to expose the
court's decision to public scrutiny, to nail it up on the wall for all to see. In no other way can it be
known whether . . . the court is doing its job, whether a particular judge is competent.");
Eisgruber, supra note 8, at 1003 (noting the impact that "hav[ing] to justify the result in a
document subject to public criticism" will have on the judicial decisionmaking process);
Oldfather, supra note 8, at 747 (noting that judicial opinions enable the public to "monitor the
court's performance").
18. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 44.
19. The extent to which appellate review serves as a meaningful constraint on judicial
discretion is likely to vary both by court and legal issue, given the growing case load at the U.S.
Courts of Appeal, the low statistical probability of Supreme Court review, and the Court's own
placement at the top of the judicial hierarchy. See Toby J. Stem, Comment, Federal Judges and
Fearing the "Floodgates of Litigation," 6 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 377, 386-91 (2003) (discussing the
rise in case loads at the U.S. Courts of Appeal and its impact on the quality of review); The
Supreme Court of the United States, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
faq.aspx#faqgi9 (noting that the Supreme Court receives approximately 10,000 petitions for writ
of certiorari each year and grants only seventy-five to eighty).
20. Wells, supra note 13, at 89.
21. See id. (noting the constraining function that separate opinions play).
654 [Vol. 66:649
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To sum up, then, judicial opinions serve three primary functions: to
enable litigants to respond to a court's decree and to inform the public of
its legal rights and responsibilities (rule of law); to effect public persua-
sion through the practice of reasoned justification (legitimacy); and to
facilitate oversight by both judges and the public (constraint).2 2 After
assessing these functions, it is not difficult to see why judicial opinions
ought to be comprehensible. A general principle of comprehension is
implied in each:23 judicial opinions cannot notify, inform, persuade, or
otherwise make oversight possible if they cannot be understood.
The more interesting question, then, is not whether judicial opin-
ions ought to be comprehensible-clearly they must-but rather, to
whom must they be comprehensible? This is the question of audience,
which requires that we identify the limits of the judicial obligation to
write comprehensible opinions.
Those commentators who have addressed the audience question
generally subscribe to one of two approaches, the narrower of which I
refer to as the "professional approach," and the broader of which I call
the "populist approach." The professional approach envisions that the
relevant audience of judicial opinions is comprised of legal professionals
and government elites, thereby placing little to no emphasis on the
importance of public comprehension. The following statement from
Henry Hart typifies this approach:
[T]he test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts, outside the
four corners of the particular lawsuit, in guiding the judgment of the
hundreds of thousands of lawyers and government officials who have
to deal at first hand with the problems of everyday life and of the
thousands of judges who have to handle the great mass of the litiga-
tion which ultimately develops.24
22. For substantively similar views on the primary functions judicial opinions serve, see
Lebovits, supra note 4, at 244-45 (explaining that communication with litigants, the constraint of
arbitrariness, ensuring correctness, and precedent are the primary functions that judicial opinions
serve); Wells, supra note 13, at 86-89 (explaining that guidance, persuasion, judicial
accountability, and legitimacy are the primary functions that judicial opinions serve).
23. Cf Wanderer, supra note 4, at 48 (noting the relationship between the "judiciary's
responsibility to communicate clearly" and the ability of judicial opinions to "achiev[e] the goals
of our judicial system").
24. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 96 (1959); see, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations
Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. Rev. 810, 813-14 (1961) (noting a range of
comments offered by various state and federal appellate judges indicating their endorsement of the
professional approach); Burke Marshall, Foreword in GOLDSTmN, supra note 4, at 7 ("Familiarity
with the Court's work overwhelmingly demonstrates at a minimum that the members of the Court
view their work as directed at the elite, and not to the people."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Role of the Academic Commentator, 40 S. TEx. L. REV.
943, 948-49 (noting that "the Court writes for a very limited audience" including "the parties[,]
6552012]
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Conversely, the populist approach, as the label itself suggests, empha-
sizes wide-reaching accessibility and envisions the relevant audience for
judicial opinions as encompassing the general public. In this regard, con-
sider Justice Hugo Black's declaration that "litigants, people in barber
shops, [and] 'your momma"' ought to be able to understand his opin-
ions,2 5 or Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's focus on the "wide audience"
to which judicial opinions ought to be accessible.2 6
But while prominent voices exist on both ends of the opinion-writ-
ing spectrum, a closer look at the functions judicial opinions serve sug-
gests that the narrower professional approach must ultimately be
rejected and supplanted by the populist approach.27 First, the rule of law
function necessitates a broad level of public comprehension, given that
each citizen is bound by the precedents judicial opinions create. Indeed,
public comprehension is vital, since the broad sweep of judicial opinions
shapes the lives of American citizens and is backed by the coercive
power of the state. Second, the democratic legitimacy that reason-giving
and justification confer on judges similarly requires a broad standard of
public accessibility due to the public consent principle that undergirds
persuasion on a societal scale. In other words, the "consent of the gov-
erned" demands persuasion of the entirety of the governed, rather than
of some elite subsection of it. And finally, a judicial opinion's function
as a facilitator of public oversight also establishes a concomitant princi-
ple of public comprehension, since the only way members of the public
can scrutinize a judge's decisionmaking process is if they are able to
understand the opinions that record it.
In sum, the general principle of comprehension inherent in judicial
opinions entails, in its practical application, a standard of public compre-
hension. Thus, the audience for which judicial opinions ought to be
intelligible is wide indeed. With that normative benchmark in mind, I
devote the rest of this Essay to exploring the relationship between the
theory and practice of intelligible opinion writing by focusing on that
... lower courts[,] . . . future litigants[,] . . . legislative staffs[,] . . . academics[,] . . . and the
media").
25. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 325 (2d ed. 1997).
26. Forrester, supra note 3, at 167 (quoting Letter from J. Sandra Day O'Connor, U.S.
Supreme Court, to Ray Forrester, Professor, Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law (May 11, 1988)).
On the academic side, Ray Forrester has noted the importance of writing judicial opinions "for
people in general of varying levels of education and intelligence," id. at 173, while Joseph
Goldstein has argued that it is important that Supreme Court opinions be comprehensible to the
entire public, GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 112.
27. Cf Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28,
1820), in 10 THE WRmTNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 161 (1899) (explaining that if the people
themselves are "not enlightened enough" to exercise the "ultimate powers of society . . . with a
wholesome discretion," then the only remedy is to "inform their discretion").
[Vol. 66:649656
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singular judicial institution whose opinions bind the entire nation: the
United States Supreme Court.
II. SUPREME COURT OPINION WRITING AND PUBLIC COMPREHENSION
The standard metric for determining the accessibility of judicial
opinions encompasses two dimensions.2 8 The first, clarity, evaluates
whether an opinion effectively communicates its holding and supporting
rationale using language the reader can understand. The clarity dimen-
sion is composed of two different subparts, what I refer to as "clarity of
thought" and "clarity of expression." The former focuses on the quality
of an opinion's reasoning-that is, does the opinion intelligibly articu-
late "the steps and connections in a logical argument"?2 9 Conversely, the
latter is concerned with presentation, determining whether an opinion
contains prose, grammar, punctuation, structure, and an overall format
that are comprehensible to the reader.3 0
And yet, while clarity is a necessary condition of intelligibility, it is
not alone sufficient. Even if an opinion is written clearly, it can still be
so lengthy, and therefore so time consuming, that it is simply inaccessi-
ble to the general reader. Thus, the second dimension that commentators
evaluate when gauging accessibility is brevity: Does an opinion commu-
nicate its essential reasoning in as few words as possible?31 The impor-
tance of this quantitative dimension cannot be understated, given that
time is a limited resource, and lengthy opinions can require a greater
expenditure of resources than readers have to offer.32
According to a variety of experts-including lower court judges,
law professors, and legal journalists-the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions are neither clear nor brief. First, critics point out that many of the
Court's opinions are so obfuscated that they create turmoil within the
legal system itself. According to New York Times reporter Adam Liptak,
"[i]n decisions on questions great and small, the court often provides
28. See, e.g., Wanderer, supra note 4, at 55 (noting the importance of writing "clear" and
"concise" opinions); Forrester, supra note 3, at 175 (noting that "lack of simplicity" and "length"
are both "major fault[s] of present Supreme Court opinions"); Liptak, supra note 4 (criticizing the
Court for its lack of clarity and brevity).
29. Gopen, supra note 4, at 335.
30. See id. at 348.
31. In the oft-referenced words of William Strunk and E. B. White, "Omit needless words!
Omit needless words! Omit needless words!" WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E. B. WHITE, THE
ELEMENTS OF STYLE (3d ed. 1979).
32. See Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S.
Supreme Court Opinions, 45 Hous. L. REv. 621, 628 (2008) (explaining that "lengthy opinions
make even more difficult the public's task of decoding the Court's decisions"); Doni Gewirtzman,
Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture,
93 GEO. L.J. 897, 917 (2005) ("Time and attention are limited resources. As a result, citizens must
make deliberate choices about what to focus on and gather information about.").
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only limited or ambiguous guidance to lower courts."3 3 As Professor
Arthur Miller similarly notes, one of the Court's most impactful recent
decisions-Ashcroft v. Iqbal3 4-has caused substantial "confusion and
disarray among judges and lawyers," leading him to describe the opinion
as "shadowy at best." 35 Eleventh Circuit Judge Frank Hull likewise
imparts that the Court's recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evi-
dences "a marked lack of clarity," causing lower court judges to struggle
with applying it correctly. 36 These sorts of examples raise the obvious
point that if legal experts are struggling to decipher the meaning of the
Court's writing, then one might reasonably assume that the average
American is faring far worse.
Inherent in that assumption, of course, lies another assumption:
That the average American actually has the time required to read
through the Court's increasingly lengthy opinions. For even if we set
clarity aside, the sheer number of pages the Court currently produces is
sufficient to deter all but the most devoted Court followers. For exam-
ple, during the 2009 term, the median length of the Court's majority
opinions (4,751 words) and the overall length of its opinions including
dissents and concurrences (8,265 words) were at an all-time high."
These numbers included, for example, the blockbuster Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission," weighing in at an awe-inspiring 183
pages and over 48,000 words.3 ' And since the Court issues approxi-
mately eighty judicial opinions per year, the time burden on a citizen
interested in reading them is, quite simply, overwhelming. As Ray For-
rester puts it, "[t]he practical result of the verbosity and sheer bulk of the
opinions is to erect a heavy curtain of words between an unfortunate
decision and the public awareness and understanding of what is going
on."40
With the foregoing problems of obfuscation and verbosity in mind,
commentators have urged the justices to reverse course by increasing
both the clarity and brevity of their writing.41 These are the traditional
reforms that are suggested to combat the comprehension problem. But
33. See Liptak, supra note 4 (discussing the lack of clarity in recent Supreme Court opinions
such as City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010), Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
and Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007)).
34. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
35. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 DuKE L.J. 1, 24, 31 (2010).
36. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 844 (1lth Cir. 2010).
37. Liptak, supra note 4.
38. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
39. Liptak, supra note 4.
40. Forrester, supra note 3, at 177.
41. See, for example, sources cited supra note 4.
[Vol. 66:649658
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while there is little doubt that such reforms are vital, as both clarity and
brevity in judicial opinion writing are necessary components of a well-
functioning legal system, they are not alone sufficient to address the true
scope of the problem-that is, to enable the Court's work to meet the
broad standard of public accessibility discussed supra in Part I. An over-
view of the stunningly low rates of civic literacy, and legal literacy in
particular, illuminate why this is so.
As Ilya Somin puts it, "the low level of political knowledge among
American citizens is one of the best-established findings in all social
science."4 2 Studies reveal, for example, that a majority of Americans
lacks basic information about the responsibilities of individual agencies
and public officials,4 3 while one-third of Americans cannot even name a
single branch of government." Studies similarly demonstrate that the
public knows very little about the Constitution; consider that 80% of
Americans cannot identify two First Amendment rights, 98% cannot
identify two Fifth Amendment rights,4 5 55% believe that the right to
education is part of the First Amendment, 46 and a majority of Americans
cannot even identify how many senators the Constitution mandates.47 In
the words of Charles Quigley, the Executive Director of the Center for
Civic Education, Americans have "an appalling lack of knowledge of a
document that impacts their daily lives."48
Most relevant to the public comprehension problem at the heart of
this Essay, though, is the fact that high rates of legal illiteracy pervade
American life.4 9 In fact, there is significant public confusion as to the
42. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1371
(2004).
43. Id. at 1305.
44. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and Support
for the Courts: Survey Results, 2007 GEo. L.J. 899, 899 (2007).
45. See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & Scorr KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNow ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 71 (1996).
46. Rachel Gillespie, Do You Think Teens Know the Diference Between Madison and Marx?,
A More Perfect Blog: the Official Blog of the Bill of Rights Institute (Dec. 15, 2010), http://blog.
billofrightsinstitute.org/2010/12/do-you-think-teens-know-the-difference-between-madison-and-
marx/.
47. Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, Current Status, and the Future, 62
ALB. L. REv. 1425, 1434-35 (1999).
48. Id.; see Neal Devins, The D'oh! of Popular Constitutionalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1333,
1340 (2007) (reviewing JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: How THE COURTS
SERVE AMERICA (2006)) ("How Much Does the Public Know about the Constitution? Next-to-
nothing.").
49. See Janet Stidman Eveleth, Advancing the Public's Understanding of the Law: The Value
of Law-Related Education, 36 MD. B.J. 44, 44 (2003) (discussing high levels of legal illiteracy
and that "[t]oday's average citizen knows little about our justice system, and understands even
less"); Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 44, at 899 (noting that "public knowledge about both the
Constitution and the courts is low").
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very nature of the judicial role: Approximately half of all Americans
believe that judges are responsible for enforcing, rather than interpret-
ing, the law.50 And more than a third of all Americans are misinformed
as to one of the most basic tenets of our criminal justice system-that a
criminal defendant is innocent until proven guilty-instead believing
just the opposite: "that the defendant must prove innocence rather than
the prosecutor must prove guilt."5'
Americans are also uninformed as to the role and responsibilities of
the U.S. Supreme Court. As Kathleen Jamieson and Michael Hennessy
highlight: (1) close to a majority of Americans (45%) either affirma-
tively believes that the Supreme Court cannot strike down a statute as
unconstitutional (22%) or do not know (23%); (2) a near majority (47%)
believes that the justices do not regularly give written reasons for their
rulings (18%) or do not know (29%); and (3) a majority (53%) believes
that a 5-4 decision by the Supreme Court carries a different amount of
legal weight than does a unanimous decision, while 39% believe that
this split decision must either be referred to Congress for resolution
(23%) or reheard by lower courts (16%).52 Americans even lack basic
knowledge of the Court's decisions;5 1 in this regard, one study revealed
that a majority of Americans could not describe the content of landmark
decisions such as Roe v. Wade5 1 or Miranda v. Arizona.5 ' As Doni
Gewirtzman aptly sums it up, "large segments of the public are essen-
tially ignorant about the Court and its work."5 6
Such high levels of civic illiteracy, and of legal illiteracy in particu-
lar, strongly support the otherwise well-established conclusion that the
Court's opinions are inaccessible to most Americans." Specifically,
50. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (1999).
51. Id. at 9.
52. Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 44, at 900 (discussing data from Annenberg Judicial
Independence Survey, September 2006 (2006 Survey); Annenberg Supreme Court Survey:
Lawyers and the Public, June 2005 (2005 Survey)). Jamieson and Hennessy similarly note that
"35% think that it was the intention of the Founding Fathers to have each branch hold a lot of
power but the President have the final say." Id.
53. See Devins, supra note 48, at 1340 ("The Court's decisions go unnoticed by nearly all
Americans."); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,
2620-23 (2003) (discussing the data on public awareness of Supreme Court opinions and reaching
the conclusion that "only a small fraction of the Supreme Court's work is likely to be salient with
the public").
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 45, at 70-71 (noting that 55% of
survey participants were not able to state the holding of Miranda v. Arizona and 70% were not
able to state the holding of Roe v. Wade).
56. Gewirtzman, supra note 32, at 920; see Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 950 ("The public
is remarkably ignorant about the Supreme Court.").
57. See Forrester, supra note 3, at 187 (noting that "[t]oday, most Supreme Court opinions are
incomprehensible to the general public"); Tony Mauro, The Chief and Us: Chief Justice William
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they demonstrate that the average American simply does not possess
enough substantive legal knowledge to be able to comprehend judicial
opinions covering the range of complex issues the Court confronts. To
understand why this is so, consider the following discussion by political
scientists Richard Niemi and Jane Junn on the impact that knowledge of
political facts has on the comprehension of political analysis:
[I]n truth, there exists no list of essential political facts. At the same
time, it is important for citizens to know some facts and, in general,
the more the better. Almost any single piece of information by itself
seems unessential. One can live one's daily life without knowing that
the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces or, for that
matter, without knowing the name of the president. But how many
political discussions and how many news reports would be incompre-
hensible without this information? And the more political information
citizens have, the more sense they can make of those discussions and
news reports ....
The general principle underlying Niemi and Junn's argument is both
straightforward and intuitive: to make sense of a subject-specific analy-
sis, a reader must possess some minimum level of knowledge relevant to
the subject under discussion. Its application to the context of judicial
opinion writing is similarly clear: the dearth of law-related facts pos-
sessed by the average American strongly suggests that discussions pre-
mised upon the application of those facts to complex questions of law
are going to be incomprehensible.
There are two important takeaways here. The first is for the propo-
nents of clarity- and brevity-based reforms. Conceptualizing the incom-
prehensibility of judicial opinions as a top-down problem-that is, as a
malady rooted in the justices' obfuscation and long-windedness-misses
the more systemic cause of unintelligibility for many Americans: legal
illiteracy. While increased clarity and brevity are important goals, to be
sure, they do not capture the entire picture of unintelligible opinion writ-
ing. Rather, a bottom-up approach to reform-that is, one grounded in
civic education-is also necessary to confront the public comprehension
problem.
Second, and more generally, given the substantial levels of legal
illiteracy that pervade American life, attempting to address the public
Rehnquist, The News Media, and the Need for Dialogue Between Judges and Journalists, 56 SYR.
L. REv. 407, 411 (2006) (noting that "a large number of [Supreme Court opinions]-including
some of the most important ones-will be nearly incomprehensible to many members of the
public" and that "the law has reached a level of complexity that puts many decisions beyond the
reach of lay people (and many lawyers too)").
58. RICHARD G. NIEMI & JANE JUNN, Civic EDUCATION: WHAT MAKES STUDENTS LEARN 11
(1998); see CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 45, at 294 (noting that "factual political knowledge is
the most important component of a broader notion of political sophistication").
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comprehension problem within the confines of a one-size-fits-all
approach is not only impractical, but is imprudent as well. The variance
between low legal literacy rates and the complex legal issues that the
Court confronts suggests that requiring the Court's regular opinions to
be broadly accessible to the public would constrain its ability to ade-
quately address the issues before it. There is surely a limit on the extent
to which the resolution of challenging legal issues can be simplified
without sacrificing essential analytical depth or nuance. Thus, notwith-
standing the Court's mandate to issue opinions that are as clear and suc-
cinct as possible, its overriding adjudicatory obligation requires that the
quality of justice dispensed not be bounded by the limits of public
comprehension.
The quandary with which we are left demands a program of reform
that would enable the Court to better meet its goal of broad accessibility
while still allowing it to engage in the level of analysis that the labyrin-
thine issues before it demand. In the third and final Part of this Essay, I
propose a potential solution that could achieve this: the implementation
of a Public Opinion program.
III. PUBLIC OPINIONS
The general mandate underlying a Public Opinion program is to
translate each of the Court's published opinions into a publicly accessi-
ble medium of judicial communication, which accounts for both the low
rates of civic literacy and the limited time the average American has to
devote to reading the Court's work. What follows in this part is an
attempt at transforming this mandate into a workable program of reform.
It is important to note at the outset, however, that this part paints
with broad strokes, with the intended goal of identifying the overall
structure of a Public Opinion program rather than specifying its particu-
lars. The details of a Public Opinion program ought to be built upon the
best research of the day by experts in the relevant education-specific
fields (indeed, the interdisciplinary composition of the "Office of Public
Opinion," discussed infra, specifically reflects this important point), and
this explication not only leaves such experts with the space to accom-
plish this, but expressly invites them to do so.
If Public Opinions are to effectively translate the Court's regular
opinions into a publicly accessible, civic-education-based format-
thereby enabling the justices to meet the benchmark of public accessibil-
ity discussed in Part 11-the primary hurdle they must overcome is the
high rates of legal illiteracy. In order to surmount that obstacle, the first
component of a Public Opinion-the "Essentials" section-must accom-
plish two goals. First, the section must explain as many of an opinion's
[Vol. 66:649662
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essential legal facts and concepts as possible in an effort to bridge the
divide between the uninformed citizen and the complex legal issues reg-
ularly before the Court. Second, the section must provide the reader with
this information in an easily navigable way so as to enable the reader to
economize on time-that is, the section should allow the reader to
absorb those legal facts and concepts with which she is unfamiliar, while
ignoring those she already understands.
The next component of a Public Opinion is the "Background" sec-
tion, which is devoted to providing a case's factual and procedural con-
text alongside a succinct overview of the legal issues presented. Each of
the three segments of the Background section-facts, procedure, and
law-ought to be communicated in an engaging narrative style that
highlights the relevant human drama or high stakes involved in the case.
Whether the case presents an exciting set of facts, a vigorous inter-cir-
cuit dispute, or an otherwise interesting legal issue, the key here is to
pique the reader's interest by underscoring the aspects of the case that
lend themselves to a sense of provocativity, while retaining the integrity
of the case itself.59 After finishing this section, the reader should possess
a general understanding of both the factual and legal issues in a given
case, as well as a basic grasp on how those lower court judges who
previously grappled with the issues resolved them.
The third and final component of a Public Opinion is the opinion
summary itself, the "Decision" section. This section is the heart of a
Public Opinion; it is a translation of the essential parts of the Court's
rationale, including concurrences and dissents, into an accessible capsule
summary expressed as simply as possible and lacking formalistic hur-
dles, such as footnotes, citations, or legalese, that have the effect of
"separat[ing] the opinion from the general public."60 This requires Pub-
lic Opinion drafters to condense the regular opinion's rationale to its
bare essentials, thereby emphasizing accessibility, clarity, and brevity
rather than breadth of coverage. In so doing, the drafters must be careful
to safeguard the integrity of the Court's reasoning; indeed, Public Opin-
ions must always retain a reflective, rather than revisionary, character.
Indeed, given the substantial level of discretion involved, the drafting of
a Public Opinion is more of a craft than a science. Deciding what ought
to be retained and what ought to be excised should not only turn upon
legal considerations-that is, what is essential to retain an opinion's
core reasoning-but also upon pedagogical concerns and an understand-
59. Indeed, the Supreme Court generally does not grant certiorari to cases that do not
encompass at least one of these angles; the challenge is to communicate them to the average
reader in an interesting, relatable manner so as to create a desire to learn more.
60. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 121; see, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U.
COLO. L. REV. 647, 648 (1985) (noting the difficulty of reading with footnotes).
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ing of the average American's cognitive capacities.6 1
With that in mind, it is worth discussing how, exactly, the Court
might implement a comprehensive Public Opinion program. As a gen-
eral matter, the substantial investment of resources and varying expertise
that a Public Opinion program requires justifies the creation of an Office
of Public Opinion housed within the Court devoted to administering the
program. Specifically, that office ought to consist of individual experts
culled from the relevant fields of law, education, and psychology so as
to ensure the multidisciplinary objectives of accuracy in translation,
accessibility in presentation, and efficacy in communication are met.
And yet, while the Office of Public Opinion would be charged with
composing the first draft of a Public Opinion, the Public Opinion's role
in bridging the gap between the Court and the people demands authorial
ownership by the justices themselves. 62 This means that the Court must
retain a supervisorial role over the Office staff and the translation pro-
cess so as to ensure that the Public Opinions correspond with their regu-
lar opinions. To best facilitate this, the authoring justice would be
responsible for approving as a fair and accurate portrayal the portion of
Public Opinion translation representing his or her majority, concurrence,
or dissent. Further, regular opinions and public opinions ought to be
released simultaneously. While this would require collaboration between
chambers and Public Opinion staff, and therefore an expenditure of the
Court's time, the value of such collaboration cannot be understated. Pub-
lic Opinions would not only benefit from the justices' authorial owner-
ship-ensuring that they constitute legitimate representations of the
Court's work-but the justices themselves might also benefit, given that
the process would require each justice to regularly confront the non-
legalistic, plain English import of his or her decisions prior to
61. For anecdotal evidence that even children can engage with difficult legal issues once
provided the foundational facts and concepts underlying those issues, see Michael Serota, Civic
Education and Popular Constitutional Interpretation, JURIST-FORUM, Nov. 18, 2010, http://
jurist.org/forum/2010/1 l/civic-education-and-popular-constitutional-interpretation.php (discussing
one instructor's experience teaching high school students to grapple with complex issues of
constitutional interpretation). For a fascinating look at how an ombudsman might be used in the
legislative context to facilitate the effective communication of complex legal issues by lawmakers
to the children they represent, see generally Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary
Representation and Deliberative Engagement with Children, 20 J. POL. PHI.. (forthcoming 2012).
62. While Public Opinions are clearly juridical in nature, they are not intended to have any
legal effect or precedential value; therefore, each Public Opinion should state that up front. Like
the case summaries the justices read from the bench when opinions are released, Public Opinions
would function solely as a communicative and educative device, and not as a source of legal
authority. See generally Christopher W. Schmidt & Carolyn Shapiro, Oral Dissenting on the





This concludes my preliminary outline of a Public Opinion pro-
gram.64 While many details must still be filled in, hopefully its basic
components have been clearly elucidated. At this point, it is worth
addressing one possible objection to the implementation of a Public
Opinion program: that it would be superfluous due to the wide-ranging
media coverage of the Court. As I explain below, however, a closer
examination of the overly politicized, excessively narrow, and unduly
simplistic character of this coverage in fact highlights, rather than obvi-
ates, the novelty and importance of a Public Opinion program.
The literature on Supreme Court reporting reveals a panoply of
defects. First, scholars routinely note that media coverage does not
reflect the entirety of the Court docket, and that this misrepresentation
pervades newsmagazine, newspaper, and television news stories.6 6 More
disconcerting than the selective coverage, however, is that many com-
mentators characterize the quality of reporting on the Court as both shal-
low and divisive. As Justice William 0. Douglas once put it, "the author
of the court opinion would hardly recognize [the media's reporting] as
descriptive of what he had written."67 More recently, Justice Antonin
Scalia harangued the media's overly simplistic results-oriented focus by
stating that "[u]sually, the criticism in the press . .. has nothing to do
with the law . . . . They'll just tell you who the plaintiff was, what the
63. For a general argument on the importance of a pre-release viewing by the justices, see
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 111 (noting that a pre-release viewing would "ensure that the
opinions are clear about the nature and extent of concord and discord among the justices
concerning the constitutional issues that they address").
64. Although the Public Opinion program I propose here is focused on the U.S. Supreme
Court, comparable programs could be instituted by state courts and other federal courts. The civic
illiteracy-based underpinnings of the comprehension problem suggest that all courts likely face
similar problems in terms of the intelligibility of their work.
65. See, e.g., DAVID L. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 4 (1968) (quoting
journalist Max Freedman as stating that "the Supreme Court is the worst reported and worst
judged institution in the American system of government"); Elliot E. Slotnick, Media Coverage of
Supreme Court Decision Making: Problems and Prospects, 75 JUDICATURE 128, 131 (1991)
("Commentary has been frequent in criticism of the press for its coverage of the judiciary.").
66. Rorie L. Spill & Zoe M. Oxley, Philosopher Kings or Political Actors?: How the Media
Portray the Supreme Court, 87 JUDICATURE 22, 23 (2003) (citing Michael E. Solimine,
Newsmagazine Coverage of the Supreme Court, 57 JOURNAISM Q. 661 (1980)); see Dorothy A.
Bowles & Rebekah V. Bromley, Newsmagazine Coverage of the Supreme Court During the
Reagan Administration, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 948, 949 (1992); Richard Davis, Lifting the Shroud:
News Media Portrayal of the U.S. Supreme Court, 9 COMM. & L. 43, 43 (1987); Ethan Katsh, The
Supreme Court Beat: How Television Covers the U.S. Supreme Court, 67 JUDICIATURE 6, 8
(1983); Jerome O'Callaghan & James 0. Dukes, Media Coverage of the Supreme Court's
Caseload, 69 JOURNAuSM Q. 195, 195 (1992); J. Douglas Tarpley, American Newsmagazine
Coverage of the Supreme Court, 1978-81, 61 JOURNALISM Q. 801, 801 (1984).
67. CHARLES PRESS & KENNETH VERBURG, AMERICAN POLITICIANS AND JOURNALISTs 10
(1988) (quoting Justice William 0. Douglas).
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issue was and who won. If you like the result then it's a great opinion,
and if you don't like it, it's terrible." 68 Another commentator describes
how the media regularly preoccupies itself with "the drama of human
situations and the thrill of clashes between important interests" rather
than the "essential" task of "relating what has been decided to the lives
of the readers." 69 Therefore, the popular media coverage we are left with
is, as Amnon Reichman puts it, "the jurisprudence of sound bites rather
than the jurisprudence of concept, interest, or value.""0 Substantial short-
comings such as these illuminate the need for a more balanced, compre-
hensive, substantive, and therefore, educative, source of judicial
information. Public Opinions are one potential solution. 1
Having established the necessity of a Public Opinion program, it is
also worth considering some of its potential benefits beyond enabling
judicial opinions to realize their essential purposes. The educative value
of the Public Opinion suggests many. First, as Niemi and Junn point out,
"political knowledge helps citizens operate effectively in a democracy,
heightens their awareness of the limits of both governmental and citizen
behavior, [and] increases attainment of democratic goals by promoting
more equal access among citizens."7 2 William Galston similarly notes a
direct correlation between civic literacy and normatively desirable civic
modes of behavior, such as "political participation [and the] expression
of democratic values including toleration, stable political attitudes, and
adoption of enlightened self-interest."7 Findings such as these suggest
that, by providing the public with a unique source of law-related civic
education, a Public Opinion program could contribute to the democratic
vitality of the polity while cultivating the civic virtue of its citizens.
68. MJ Lee, Antonin Scalia Dissents on Press Criticism, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2011) (quoting
Justice Antonin Scalia).
69. Irving R. Kaufman, Helping the Public Understand and Accept Judicial Decisions, 63
A.B.A. J. 1567, 1568 (1977); see Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its
Public Perception, and the Role of the Scholar, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1619, 1639 (2007) (explaining
that "the media is likely to highlight elements it perceives as controversial or as likely to arouse a
controversial reaction"); Spill & Oxley, supra note 66, at 29 (noting the media's emphasis "on the
political implications and speculation for future activities rather than on the legal facts or on the
rationale of the justices"). The quality of coverage coming from the legal blogosphere, however, is
generally of much higher quality, and some sites, such as SCOTUSblog, provide that coverage in a
more publicly accessible fashion.
70. Reichman, supra note 69, at 1641.
71. It is worth noting that Public Opinions might also provide the media with an important
source of information on the Court, thereby enhancing the quality of its own reporting as well.
72. NIEMI & JuNN, supra note 58, at 11; see Tom Donnelly, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic
Education, and the Stories We Tell Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 967 (2009) (noting the
general consensus that civic education can "lead to greater student involvement in the community
and politics").




Second, these same educative benefits might also help to obviate
negative public perceptions of the judiciary. As Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor-civic education advocate par excellence-has noted,
"[c]itizens who are less knowledgeable about the judiciary are more
likely to believe that judges are biased and less likely to believe that
courts act in the public interest."74 In O'Connor's view, the survival of
an independent judiciary is dependent upon public understanding,
requiring a proactive effort to preserve the judiciary "as a meaningful
part of our constitutional framework."" Given the Public Opinion pro-
gram's potential as a vehicle for civic education on the judiciary, such a
program would be directly responsive to O'Connor's call.
Finally, a Public Opinion program would also be responsive to the
Court's institutional educative calling. As Eugene Rostow famously
noted, "[t]he Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational
body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national semi-
nar."7 6 Over the years since Rostow first set forth his vision of the Court
qua national civics instructor, many commentators have endorsed it. 7
Consider, for example, Joseph Goldstein, who argues that "an intelligent
democracy" depends upon Supreme Court opinions that clearly teach the
public about rights, values, and the limits of government. Or consider
Christopher Eisgruber, who, in an article devoted to exploring Rostow's
view, argues that the Court's educative mandate is actually an inbuilt
feature of the constitutional architecture, providing the justices with a
robust incentive and opportunity to teach." But if these commentators
are correct, and the Court is in fact an educative institution, then the
justices' opinions-their primary means of instruction-ought to be tai-
74. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Democratic Purpose of Education: From the Founders to
Horace Mann to Today, in TEACHING AMERICA: THE CASE FOR Civic EDUCATION 3 (2011) (citing
Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 44, at 902); cf Wanderer, supra note 4, at 50 (noting that
"[w]hen people do not feel committed to judicial pronouncements because they do not understand
them.. .. cynicism about legal institutions flourishes").
75. O'Connor, supra note 74, at 8.
76. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193,
208 (1952).
77. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 112 (endorsing Rostow's view); ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (2d ed. 1986) (1962) (same); ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 249 (1990) (same); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTs 112 (1982) (quoting Rostow); Eisgruber, supra note 8, at 1028-32
(supporting the view of the justices as educators); see also Allen D. Black, Judge Wisdom, the
Great Teacher and Careful Writer, 109 YALE L.J. 1267, 1269 (2000) (arguing that judicial
opinions must "teach basic principles of democracy, equal protection of the laws, and
constitutional federalism to lawyers, government officials, and the general public"); Robin West,
Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REV. 43, 103 (1990) (noting "the educative
role of Supreme Court opinions").
78. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 6.
79. See Eisgruber, supra note 8, at 1005-13.
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lored to the abilities of their students: the general public."o
And yet, the comprehension gap discussed supra Part II confirms
that they are not. Public Opinions could thus begin to ameliorate this
problem in an intuitive and straightforward way: in their ability to serve
as a pedagogical tool to be incorporated into the civic curriculum. The
self-contained nature of Public Opinions would provide civics instruc-
tors with an effortless means of incorporating contemporary legal issues
into the classroom environment.8 1 And given their analytical content,
they would also provide a pedagogically valuable way of doing so, since
critical approaches to civics instruction are more effective than those
involving rote learning.8 2 In this way, the legal reasoning at the heart of
judicial opinions-and the Public Opinions that translate them-could
be a particularly powerful way of attuning our nation's youth to the
demands of justice at a critically important time in their civic
development.
Thus, when the foregoing panoply of educative benefits are viewed
in light of the normative benchmark of accessibility that judicial opin-
ions' primary functions suggest, there is a strong case to be made for the
Court's implementation of a civic education-based program such as the
Public Opinion program presented here.
Before concluding, one final word is in order. Although the costs of
implementing a Public Opinion program are significant, requiring the
hiring of staff, the creation of an office, and the use of the justices' time,
these costs are easily justified by the profound malady they seek to cure.
The public comprehension gap revealed in this Essay suggests that for
many Americans, the Court is little more than a political abstraction,
steering the path of American society by what likely appears from their
perspective to be sheer edict. For if the average American cannot under-
stand the Court's reasoning, then all that remains are the Court's rulings;
but rules issued by unelected judges lacking an accessible justification
can be experienced as subjugation.8 4 Indeed, this phenomenon may
80. Id. at 1030 (noting that if the people's level of comprehension is below that of the
Court's, then "the Court must bring its message down to the level of the people").
81. See NIEMI & JuNN, supra note 58, at 156 (explaining the importance of incorporating
contemporary issues into the civics classroom and the scarcity of textbooks that do this).
82. Id. at 157 (noting that civic pedagogy "should be structured to put less emphasis on rote
learning and more on analytical and critical understandings of democracy" but that "textbooks and
established practices" are focused more on "memorization and drilling"); see generally Charles
Quigley & Charles Bahmueller, Teaching Political Sophistication: On Self-Interest and the
Common Good, in TEACHING AMERICA: THE CASE FOR Civic EDUCATION (2011) (noting the
importance that civic education curricula train students to think critically).
83. See NIEMI & JUNN, supra note 58, at 156 (noting that "teaching civics later in high school,
specifically during the twelfth grade, has the most [positive] impact" on young people's political
socialization).
84. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
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explain the pervasive disaffection that we see today: a nation that knows
more about Snow White's Seven Dwarves" or the judges on American
Idol than it does about Supreme Court justices. 6 Of course, even if a
Public Opinion program were implemented, dramatic change would not
occur overnight. But by creating a pathway for citizens to begin devel-
oping a more meaningful conception of the Court's work, a Public Opin-
ion program would not only enable judicial opinions to better realize
their essential functions, but over time, would have the potential to lead
to a better-informed, more engaged citizenry and a healthier democracy.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay began by exploring the rule of law, legitimacy, and con-
straint functions that the practice of judicial opinion writing serves. A
closer look at each of these functions revealed that judicial opinions
should be intelligible not only to the legal community, but to the general
public. That the average American be able to comprehend the work of
our judiciary is an essential component of our legal order. But the analy-
sis offered in Part II revealed that the Supreme Court's opinions fall far
short of meeting the populist standard of accessibility, given the vari-
ance between the highly technical legal issues that come before the
Court and the low rates of civic literacy in America. I then explained
why this comprehension gap suggests that the regularly proffered
reforms of increased clarity and brevity in the opinion writing process
are not alone sufficient to solve the problem, and argued that a more
robust, civic education-oriented approach is necessary.
With the civic illiteracy-based architecture of the comprehension
problem in mind, Part III proposed one possible solution in the form of a
Public Opinion program that incorporated a two-tiered approach to opin-
ion writing. After introducing the primary components of a Public Opin-
ion, and discussing how a comprehensive Public Opinion program might
best be implemented, I considered the virtues of such an approach. Pub-
lic Opinions would not only enable the Court to increase the overall
intelligibility of its work without detracting from the quality of justice,
but they also could provide the public with an important new pathway
for law-related civic education, with the potential to redound a range of
normative benefits to the polity in the process.
CRTICISM 101 (1990) (noting the ability of an opinion to serve as an "authoritarian text" that
"demands simple and total obedience from its reader").
85. See Zogby International Poll, More Americans Know Snow White's Dwarfs than U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, August 15, 2006, http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.cfm?ID= 1208.
86. See Seth Schiesel, Former Justice Promotes Web-Based Civics Lessons, N.Y. TiaEs, June
9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.corn2008/06/09/arts/09sand.html.
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